skip to primary navigationskip to content
 

Marta Halina

Lecturer in the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science

I am a University Lecturer in the Philosophy of Cognitive Science. I received my PhD in Philosophy and Science Studies at the University of California, San Diego in 2013 and was a McDonnell Postdoctoral Fellow in the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program at Washington University in St. Louis before coming to Cambridge in 2014. My research focuses on nonhuman animal cognition, mechanistic explanation, and artificial intelligence.

I am currently a Project Director at the Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence and a Fellow of Selwyn College.

Research interests

General philosophy of science (experimentation, explanation, modeling, the new mechanistic philosophy), philosophy of psychology and cognitive science (comparative psychology, nonhuman animal cognition and communication, cognitive ethology, embodied and distributed cognition, neuroscience), philosophy of biology (mechanistic explanation and discovery, model organisms).

Recent publications

'Not Null Enough: Pseudo-Null Hypotheses in Community Ecology and Comparative Psychology' (with William Bausman). Biology & Philosophy (2018)

'The Goal of Ape Pointing' (with Katja Liebal and Michael Tomasello). PLOS ONE (2018)

'Octopuses as Conscious Exotica', Essay Review of Other Minds by Peter Godfrey-Smith, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences (2017)

'Domains of Generality' (with Andrew Buskell), Commentary on Burkart et al. "The evolution of general intelligence", Behavioural and Brain Sciences (2017)

'Mechanistic Explanation and Its Limits', Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Mechanisms, edited by Stuart Glennan and Phyllis Illari (2017)

'What Apes Know About Seeing', Routledge Handbook on Animal Minds, edited by Kristin Andrews and Jake Beck (2017)

'There is No Special Problem of Mindreading in Nonhuman Animals', Philosophy of Science 82 (2015): 473–490